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Does the Indexing of Government Transfers Make Carbon Pricing Progressive? 
Don Fullerton, Garth Heutel, and Gilbert E. Metcalf 
Whether in the form of a carbon tax or cap-and-trade permit system, climate policy is 
likely to raise the price of all energy-intensive goods such as electricity, heating fuel, and 
gasoline.  The fraction of income used on these goods falls with income, measured either 
by annual income or by total annual expenditure (as a proxy for permanent income).   
Thus, climate policy is found to be regressive on the “uses side” (e.g. Burtraw et al. 2009 
and Hasset et al. 2009).  For these reasons, the economics literature and actual legislation 
have focused on whether permit revenue can be used to offset regressive burdens.  
 In contrast, Rausch et al. (2010) use a computable general equilibrium model of 
the U.S. to find that carbon pricing is modestly progressive, even ignoring the use of the 
proceeds from a carbon tax or auctioned permits.  One factor driving this surprising result 
is the progressivity of impacts on the “sources side”.  Carbon pricing drives down returns 
to capital and to resource owners (both relative to the wage).  Those returns are a large 
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share of income sources for high income households.  A second factor is their treatment 
of transfers.  Rausch et al. hold real transfer payments constant as an element of their 
decision to hold government spending constant (and thereby isolate the effects of carbon 
pricing itself).  Because transfer payments disproportionately accrue to low income 
households, the impact is progressive.  This approach is justified in part based on the 
logic put forward by Browning and Johnson (1979) that government transfer policy is 
implicitly if not explicitly indexed.  Some U.S. transfer programs such as Social Security 
are explicitly indexed to inflation, which means that higher energy prices would 
automatically lead to cost-of-living adjustments for recipients. 
 This paper explores that assumption and the actual extent of indexing. We analyze 
both the uses side and the sources side incidence of domestic climate policy using an 
analytical general equilibrium model, taking into account the degree of government 
program indexing.  In particular we consider three scenarios: no indexing, 100 percent 
indexing, and partial indexing based on our analysis of actual transfer programs. 
 Using the model of Fullerton and Heutel (2010), we quantify the burdens of 
carbon pricing.  The model is calibrated to the U.S. economy using expenditure and 
income data from the 2008 Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) and capital income data 
from the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF).  We then analyze the distributional 
effects of carbon policy in two ways.  First, we categorize households by annual income.  
This procedure aggregates some with temporarily low income together with others who 
are perennially poor.  Second, to employ a proxy for permanent or lifetime income, we 
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categorize households by annual expenditures.  See Fullerton and Metcalf (2002) for a 
survey of literature on tax incidence. 
 When families are categorized by annual income, we find that the uses-side 
incidence of a carbon tax is regressive.  The burden on the sources side is U-shaped, with 
the largest burdens on the lowest and highest income groups.  In addition, either partial or 
full indexing of transfers is progressive.  Thus, an analysis that ignores current indexing 
rules will overestimate the regressivity of carbon pricing. 
 Indexing has a more striking impact when households are ranked by annual 
expenditures.  Regressivity on the uses side is offset by progressivity in transfer program 
indexing; the overall burden is progressive over the bottom half of the distribution and 
regressive across the top half.  The choice of income measurement (annual v. lifetime) 
has a major impact on the measured progressivity or regressivity of carbon pricing. 
Analytic General Equilibrium Model 
We use the model of Fullerton and Heutel (2010), a two-sector closed economy analytical 
general equilibrium model in the tradition of Harberger (1962).  Two fixed factors are 
mobile between sectors and fully employed, with full information, certainty, perfect 
competition, and constant returns to scale. A “clean” sector, X,  uses only capital  KX  and 
labor  LX, while a dirty sector,  Y,  uses both capital and labor  (KY  and  LY)  and a third 
input, pollution (Z).  The model is then linearized by differentiating production and utility 
functions, budget constraints, zero profit conditions, and resource constraints. For a small 
change in the pollution tax, the N linear equations can then be solved for the N unknown 
changes in each quantity and price. Fullerton and Heutel (2010) discuss the analytical 
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results, and then calibrate the model to the U.S. economy, where the dirty sector includes 
electricity generation, transportation, and petroleum refining.  Like Harberger (1962), we 
ensure that tax revenue reallocation has no impact on relative prices by assuming that 
pollution tax revenue is spent on the two goods in the same proportions as in consumer 
spending.  We refer the interested reader to that previous paper for model, data, and 
sensitivity analysis.  Using their primary set of parameters, for an increase in the tax on 
carbon dioxide from $15/ton to $30/ton, the price of the dirty good rises 7%, the wage 
rises 0.07%, and the return to capital falls by 0.12%.1  In order to translate those price 
changes into effects on real people, they look at thousands of households’ expenditure 
and income data from the 2008 Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) and 2007 Survey 
of Consumer Finances (SCF).  Their results for the effects of a carbon tax on output 
prices and factor prices appear in our tables below.  The purpose of the current paper is to 
add consideration of indexed transfers. 
 Table 1 summarizes the breakdown of income and expenditures by annual income 
decile.  Columns 2 through 4 show the percent of each group’s income from wages, 
capital, and transfer income such as public assistance and social security.  We omit the 
category “other income,” which accounts for less than 1% of total income.  Although 
fractions vary by income group, about 69% of overall consumer income is from wages, 
25% from capital, and 6% from transfers.  Notice that the fraction of income from 
transfers falls as income rises (except that the lowest income decile has a slightly lower 
fraction than the next decile).  The fraction of income from capital rises with income (but 
for the same exception).  Then column 5 shows the percent of transfers that are indexed, 
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as explained in the next section.  On average, over 90 percent of transfer income is 
indexed in the U.S.  The share of transfers that are indexed is lowest for the lowest 
income decile and highest for the highest income decile. 
 In the last two columns, we show each group’s expenditures on the clean and 
dirty outputs.2   Each entry shows the ratio of expenditure over annual income, not over 
total expenditures, so these two values in each row do not add to 100%.  The poorest 
households spend more than their income, while the richest spend less than their income. 
To map output price changes into consumer price changes, we label consumer 
goods as clean or dirty.  Four types of expenditures out of 74 are categorized as dirty 
because they directly involve the combustion of fossil fuels: electricity, natural gas, fuel 
oil and other fuels, and gasoline.  This choice is consistent with a more complete analysis 
of the pass-through of the costs of intermediate goods: for a CO2 tax of $15 per metric 
ton, Hassett et al. (2009) find that the prices of these four goods increase by 8-13%, while 
the prices of all other categories of goods rise less than 1%.3 
 Overall, in table 1, we see that 6.6% of income is spent on these dirty goods, and 
about nine times as much is spent on clean goods.  The expenditures pattern for these 
annual income groups is smoother than their pattern for income sources.  Lower income 
households spend a higher fraction of their total income on dirty goods than do higher 
income households.   
 Table 2 presents the same information, but where households are classified by 
annual expenditure as a proxy for lifetime income.  Income from wages now constitutes 
over 100 percent of expenditures, reflecting the fact that the households in our dataset 
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save roughly one-third of income.  The share of income from capital rises monotonically 
across expenditure groups, while the transfer share falls monotonically.  This pattern will 
be relevant below, when we consider the progressivity of carbon pricing. 
The Treatment of Indexing in our Model 
In this paper, we provide results for three different treatments of government transfers’ 
indexing to the price level.  First, we show distributional effects of carbon pricing that 
ignore indexing entirely.  These results can be compared to previous papers in this 
literature that also ignore the indexing of transfers.  Second, we show results for 100% 
indexing of all transfers, as in Rausch et al. (2010).4  Third, we show results based on a 
calculation of the actual indexing of U.S. government cash transfers. 
Table 3 shows the six categories for cash transfers in the CEX data, along with the 
mean amount for each category (the average annual receipts per household in the survey).  
The first category is unemployment compensation (UC).  Because UC benefits do not 
extend more than a year, they are not indexed to inflation.  Thus, we assume that an 
increase in energy prices would not raise the amount of these transfers. 
 The second category includes a broad set of public assistance and welfare 
programs, best exemplified by Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).  In the 
U.S., each state administers its own welfare programs, so indexing is decided by each 
state.  For the states we have studied, welfare benefits are intended to be temporary and 
therefore not officially indexed to inflation.  Of course, a state might periodically decide 
to raise the benefit level, and may do so because inflation has reduced the real value of 
those benefits, but these programs typically are not explicitly indexed. 
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 The third category is “food stamps,” officially known as the Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP).   The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
maintains the real purchasing power of the program by calculating the cost of a “thrifty 
food plan” to set benefits each year.  SNAP is essentially indexed to a food price index.  
In our model, however, food is a component of the “clean good” (because the food 
industry’s use of energy is small and indirect).  No change in the price of food means no 
increase in food stamp benefits.  Thus, SNAP is not indexed to energy prices. 
 The fourth category of transfers is by far the largest, including all payouts from 
the Social Security Administration (SSA) and Railroad Retirement programs.  The fifth 
category is Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and the sixth category of transfers 
includes both workers’ compensation (WC) and veterans benefits (VB).   The statutes 
treat all of these programs similarly in terms of indexing.  SSA and SSI payments are 
adjusted each year by the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical 
Workers (CPI-W).  This index uses the CEX weights for different goods purchased by 
urban workers, representing 32% of the U.S. population.  It is thus a broad based index, 
best approximated in our model by an index of all consumption of all households.      
Numerical Results 
We consider the effects of doubling the CO2 tax from $15 to $30 per ton.  The incidence 
results for our annual income classification of households are presented in table 4.  As in 
Fullerton and Heutel (2010), we normalize the calculated uses side burden for each group 
by subtracting from it a uses side calculation for the entire sample (because the choice of 
numeraire is arbitrary).  A positive value means that group’s ratio of expenditures to 
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income increases more than average, while a negative value means it increases less than 
average.  The calculation is analogous for factor price changes and transfers.  This 
procedure ensures that our results are not affected by the choice of numeraire.  We 
change the sign on the sources side, however, so that groups with income falling more 
than average have a positive “burden”, while groups with income falling less than 
average have a negative burden.  Finally, to calculate each group’s normalized overall 
burden, we sum effects of output prices, factor prices, and transfers. 
In the first column, the pattern of uses-side burdens clearly shows that the highest 
income groups (deciles 9 and 10) suffer a smaller than average relative burden.  The cost 
of goods decreases for them relative to the average, because they spend less than average 
on the dirty good.  Since the clean good is our numeraire, the average increase in overall 
price is about 0.48% (a 7.2% jump in the price of a good that constitutes 6.6% of annual 
income).  Thus, table 4 says that the highest income group’s price increase under this 
normalization is only about 0.18%, whereas the lowest income group faces an overall 
price increase of about 3.4%.  Our results here are consistent with Hassett et al. (2009), 
who study the uses-side incidence of a CO2 tax and find that the burden falls across 
income deciles monotonically.  For a cap-and-trade policy, Burtraw et al. (2009) find the 
same kind of regressivity on the uses side. 
In the second column of table 4, the sources-side burden is most on the highest 
and lowest income deciles.  The positive burdens for the lowest deciles indicate that their 
incomes fall proportionally more than average.  Columns (4) through (7) show how these 
basic uses and sources side impacts are affected by indexing.  Columns (4) and (6) 
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indicate that indexing of transfers adds progressivity to carbon pricing.  The difference in 
the two columns is small, because explicit indexing applies to a large share of U.S. 
transfers.  Analyses that ignore transfer program indexing will overestimate the 
regressivity of carbon pricing.  Using annual income, however, we do not find that the 
effect of indexing is sufficient to overcome the regressive effects on the uses side.  It 
remains to be determined why these results differ from those of Rausch et al. (2010).   
Table 5 presents results for the analysis where we classify households by annual 
expenditures as a proxy for lifetime income.  The uses side burden is significantly less 
regressive than in table 4.  The sources side burden from factor price changes is initially 
regressive but then progressive over the top 60 percent of the distribution.  The effect of 
indexed transfers continues to be sharply progressive under either partial or full indexing.  
Now, however, the overall burden from carbon pricing is mixed, with progressivity over 
the bottom half of the distribution combined with regressivity over the top half.   
In other words, we find that the automatic indexing of government transfers in 
existing statutes converts the net loss from carbon pricing into a net gain for the poorest 
group (categorized by total expenditure, as a proxy for permanent income).  A major 
caveat, however, is that a third of these households receive no transfer income and thus 
clearly lose from climate policy.  For either type of indexing, about 40% of this poorest 
group have an overall relative burden that is almost 0.8% of income (higher than the 
economy-wide average), while the rest have a relative gain that is 0.7% of income (less 
burden than the economy-wide average).  Thus, automatic indexing of transfers does not 
protect all of the poorest families in our sample.  
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Conclusion 
In this paper, we use a general equilibrium model of tax incidence to examine the burden 
of carbon pricing.  We find generally that changes on the uses-side are relatively more 
burdensome for low income households who spend more than average on dirty goods 
such as electricity, natural gas, gasoline, and heating oil.  Because carbon-intensive 
industries tend to be relatively capital-intensive, we find that the sources-side is relatively 
more burdensome for those who have a more than average share of income from capital.  
Thus, the burden is U-shaped when households are categorized by annual income, given 
the capital/labor income ratios in our data from the CEX and SCF.  Transfer policy adds 
progressivity, but not enough to overcome the regressive uses-side effects. 
 Categorizing households by annual expenditures tells a different story.  Now the 
uses side impacts are less dominant, so the overall burden of carbon pricing is 
progressive across the bottom half of the distribution and regressive across the top half. 
Impacts from factor price changes are hump-shaped, with the greatest relative losses at 
the top and bottom of the distribution.   The indexing of transfers confers significant 
progressivity to the system.  The choice of income measurement (annual v. lifetime) has a 
major impact on the measured progressivity or regressivity of carbon pricing. Hassett et. 
al. (2009) provide a discussion of this point. 
 The model could be improved by a number of extensions, such as adding more 
sectors, more final goods, intermediate goods, or market power and regulation.  Electric 
utilities are large emitters of CO2 and are often highly regulated, so the effect of market 
power or industry regulation may be of particular relevance to a carbon tax. 
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Table 1: Sources and Uses of Income for each Annual Income Group 
(1) 
Annual 
Income 
Decile 
(2) 
% of 
Income 
from 
Wages 
(3) 
% of 
Income 
from 
Capital 
(4) 
% of 
Income 
from 
Transfers 
(5)   
% of 
Transfer 
Income 
Indexed 
(6) 
Dirty Good 
Expenditure 
as % of 
Income 
(7) 
Clean Good 
Expenditure 
as % of 
Income 
All 69.1 24.6 6.3 94.7 6.6 58.7 
1 35.8 5.7 58.5 87.2 47.4 361.0 
2 33.9 4.1 62.1 95.2 20.3 141.9 
3 55.1 6.5 38.4 96.1 16.7 116.5 
4 68.1 7.4 24.5 95.9 13.5 97.3 
5 79.9 7.8 12.2 95.2 11.1 84.0 
6 83.4 8.8 7.8 94.5 9.6 74.8 
7 86.6 9.1 4.3 93.6 8.3 68.0 
8 86.8 10.6 2.6 91.6 7.2 62.9 
9 84.9 13.2 1.9 94.8 5.9 58.1 
10 53.5 45.6 0.9 96.9 2.5 32.6 
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Table 2: Sources and Uses of Income for each Annual Expenditure Group 
(1) 
Annual 
Expenditure 
Decile 
(2) 
% of 
Income 
from 
Wages 
(3) 
% of 
Income 
from 
Capital 
(4) 
% of 
Income 
from 
Transfers 
(5)   
% of 
Transfer 
Income 
Indexed 
(6) 
Dirty Good 
Expenditure 
as % of 
Income 
(7) 
Clean Good 
Expenditure 
as % of 
Income 
All 105.8 37.6 9.7 94.7 10.1 89.9 
1 42.8 13.5 63.5 93.6 14.5 85.5 
2 74.5 13.8 36.6 95.2 15.2 84.8 
3 86.3 16.2 26.8 94.5 14.6 85.4 
4 103.5 18.0 17.7 94.6 13.9 86.1 
5 108.8 20.4 13.8 94.9 13.2 86.8 
6 114.4 29.4 10.0 94.1 12.3 87.7 
7 118.8 31.2 7.3 94.5 11.5 88.5 
8 120.0 38.4 5.7 94.6 10.8 89.2 
9 124.6 45.1 3.9 95.3 9.3 90.7 
10 93.4 54.7 2.4 96.9 5.9 94.1 
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Table 3:  Six Categories of Cash Transfers, and their Treatment in our Model 
 
Category Symbol Meana Treatment in the model 
1 unemployment compensation UC 114.5 Not indexed 
 
2 
income from public assistance or 
welfare, including money received from 
job training grants such as Job Corps 
 
TANFb 
 
30.1 
 
Not indexed 
3 
value of all food stamps and electronic 
benefits received 
SNAPc 100.6 Not indexed 
 
4 
amount of Social Security and Railroad 
Retirement income, prior to deductions 
for medical insurance and Medicare 
 
SSA 
 
4047.3 
 
100% indexed 
5 Supplementary Security Income  SSI 230.7 100% indexed 
 
6 
income from workers' compensation or 
veterans' benefits, including education 
benefits, excluding military retirement 
 
WC&VB 
 
100.4 
 
100% indexed 
a “Mean” is the annual dollar transfer, averaged over all households in the sample.  
b TANF stands for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, the major welfare program. 
c SNAP stands for Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (food stamps). 
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Table 4: Incidence for Annual Income Deciles (%) 
   Partial Indexing Full Indexing 
(1) 
Annual 
Income 
Decile 
(2) 
Relative 
Burden 
from 
Output 
Prices 
(3) 
Relative 
Burden 
from 
Factor 
Prices   
(4) 
Relative 
Burden 
from 
Transfers   
(5) 
Relative 
Overall 
Burden  
(6) 
Relative 
Burden 
from 
Transfers   
(7) 
Relative 
Overall 
Burden  
1 2.936 0.001 -0.214 2.723 -0.249 2.689 
2 0.986 0.001 -0.253 0.733 -0.266 0.720 
3 0.724 -0.012 -0.148 0.565 -0.153 0.560 
4 0.496 -0.020 -0.083 0.393 -0.086 0.389 
5 0.323 -0.028 -0.027 0.268 -0.028 0.267 
6 0.216 -0.029 -0.006 0.180 -0.007 0.180 
7 0.123 -0.031 0.009 0.101 0.010 0.101 
8 0.045 -0.029 0.017 0.032 0.018 0.033 
9 -0.051 -0.025 0.020 -0.056 0.021 -0.054 
10 -0.297 0.036 0.024 -0.236 0.026 -0.235 
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Table 5: Incidence for Annual Expenditure Deciles (%) 
   Partial Indexing Full Indexing 
(1) 
Annual 
Expenditure 
Decile 
(2) 
Relative 
Burden 
from 
Output 
Prices  
(3) 
Relative 
Burden 
from 
Factor 
Prices 
(4) 
Relative 
Burden 
from 
Transfers  
(5) 
Relative 
Overall 
Burden 
(6) 
Relative 
Burden 
from 
Transfers   
(7) 
Relative 
Overall 
Burden  
1 0.316 0.016 -0.367 -0.034 -0.393 -0.060 
2 0.366 -0.006 -0.187 0.173 -0.196 0.164 
3 0.319 -0.012 -0.118 0.189 -0.125 0.182 
4 0.273 -0.022 -0.055 0.196 -0.058 0.193 
5 0.218 -0.023 -0.029 0.166 -0.030 0.165 
6 0.157 -0.016 -0.002 0.139 -0.003 0.139 
7 0.099 -0.017 0.017 0.098 0.018 0.099 
8 0.046 -0.009 0.028 0.064 0.029 0.065 
9 -0.063 -0.005 0.040 -0.028 0.042 -0.025 
10 -0.303 0.029 0.050 -0.223 0.053 -0.220 
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Notes 
                                                          
1 Return to capital falls because the dirty sector is capital-intensive, not because 
capital and pollution are complementary inputs (they are not)..  In sensitivity 
cases, it falls by more if labor is a better substitute for pollution, and it rises if 
capital is a better substitute for pollution.  Burdens on the sources side are always 
smaller and more sensitive to parameter values than those on the uses side, so 
here we show only one set of factor price results. 
2 In the CEX, the overall ratio of expenditure to annual income is 78.7%, but our 
addition of imputed capital income from the SCF then reduces it to 65.3% (shown 
in the top row of table 1).  This figure is lower than the 85% figure in table 2.1 
(http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/SelectTable.asp?Selected=Y) of the 
National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA).  We could scale all household 
expenditures upward so that their sum is 85% of income as in the NIPA accounts, 
but we want to avoid unnecessary manipulation of the data.  In any case, a 
proportional scaling would not change our relative burden results. 
3 Air transportation prices increases by 1.86%, but rather than list spending on 
that item separately, the CEX lumps air transport with public transportation. 
4 This treatment might also be preferred for reasons discussed in Browning 
(1985).  He argues that the theory of tax incidence is based on the presumption 
that only relative prices matter, not the overall price level, and that any treatment 
of transfers other than 100% indexing would violate that principle. 
